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We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information process-
ing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations:
aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and the decision problems of dierent
agents interact. We assume that an organization forms a portfolio of risky assets, follow-
ing a hierarchical procedure. Agents' decision rules and the organization's hierarchical
structure are derived endogenously. Typically, in the optimal hierarchical structure, all
agents have one subordinate, and returns to ability are at least as high at the bottom
as at the top. However, these results can be reversed in the presence of returns to
specialization.
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Organizational decisions are usually based on large quantities of information. Such infor-
mation cannot be processed by a single agent. Therefore, information processing has to be
decentralized among many agents. Consider, for example, the decision to expand a produc-
tion plant. This decision depends on information about the plant's cost, known mainly by
the plant manager. It also depends on information about the demand for the plant's output,
known by marketing managers. Finally, it can depend on broader information about the
organization's strategy, known by top-level managers.
This paper proposes a model of organizational decision making, in which information
processing is decentralized, and information is communicated along hierarchical lines. The
model has two novel elements, relative to previous literature. First, aggregation entails a loss
of useful information, in the sense that when agents summarize their information to their
hierarchical superiors, information which is useful to the superiors is lost. Second, agents'
decision problems interact, in the sense that an agent's optimal decision should depend on
information held by agents in other parts of the organization. We use our model to examine
issues of organization design. In particular, we determine what hierarchical structure an
organization should adopt, and in what hierarchical level the returns to employing agents
who are better able to process information are the highest.
Our model is motivated from how investment rms form their portfolios. Because of the
large number of securities involved, investment rms rarely perform a full-scale portfolio
optimization. Rather, they follow a multi-stage hierarchical procedure. An example of this
procedure, for the case of three stages, is described in Sharpe (1985, p.657):
In the rst stage (security selection), combinations of securities in each of the several
stock groups and in each of the several bond groups are selected. The second stage
(group selection) involves the determination of an appropriate combination of the stock
group portfolios and an appropriate combination of the bond group portfolios. The nal
stage is devoted to asset allocation, using the bond and stock portfolios as asset-class
portfolios. In every stage but the last, decisions are made myopically, considering only
a subset of the available securities. In every stage but the rst, groups of securities are
\locked together" in xed proportions determined in prior stages.
In this hierarchical procedure, agents' decision problems obviously interact. Consider,
for example, an analyst forming a portfolio of stocks within a given group. The analyst's
1optimal portfolio should depend on information about all securities, including those outside
the group. If, for example, the securities outside the group have high systematic risk,
the analyst should favor those securities within the group that have low systematic risk.
Analysts seem, however, to form their portfolios myopically, without using information on
the securities outside their groups, presumably because they have little such information.
In addition to interactions, the hierarchical procedure involves aggregation loss. A stock
analyst, for example, summarizes his information on the stocks within his group, through
his choice of a group portfolio. This summary, however, entails a loss of useful information
for the manager in charge of the overall stock portfolio. Indeed, if the manager knew the
analyst's detailed information, he could add it to his own information on the other stock
groups, and improve on the analyst's portfolio. It is worth noting that asset-class managers
seem not to change the composition of analysts' portfolios, presumably because they lack
the detailed information to do so.
Our model is as follows. An organization can invest in one riskless and multiple risky
assets. Investing in a risky asset involves both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Systematic
risk is represented by one aggregate factor (e.g., the business cycle). Assets dier only in
how sensitive their returns are to the factor, and we refer to these return sensitivities as
factor loadings.
The organization's portfolio formation process is subject to three constraints. The
communication constraint is that the organization must have a hierarchical structure, and
communication must take place along hierarchical lines, as follows. An agent at the bottom
of the hierarchy examines some assets, and observes their factor loadings. He then forms
a portfolio of these assets, and communicates the portfolio's factor loading to his (direct)
superior. The superior forms a portfolio of the assets included in his subordinates' portfolios,
and of any additional assets he examines directly. He then communicates this portfolio's
factor loading to his own superior, and so on. The scaling constraint is that agents cannot
change the composition of their subordinates' portfolios, but can only scale portfolios up
or down, i.e., multiply the investment in each asset by the same scalar. The processing
constraint is that agents can form a portfolio of at most K < 1 inputs, where an input can
be either an asset examined directly, or a subordinate's portfolio. The processing constraint
captures agents' limitations in processing information.
The organization is designed optimally, subject to the three constraints above. The
design of the organization takes place ex-ante, before factor loadings are realized. There
2are three design parameters: the hierarchical structure, the assets each agent examines,
and agents' decision rules, i.e., the way agents map their information into portfolio weights.
The optimal set of parameters must implement a decision rule for the organization that
maximizes the expected utility of asset payos. Intuitively, this decision rule must select
a portfolio that is the closest possible to the rst-best portfolio, selected in the absence of
agents' information processing limitations.
While our model is motivated from portfolio formation in investment rms, it is also
applicable to other organizational settings. A direct application is to risk management,
by both nancial and non-nancial rms. Indeed, risk management can be viewed as a
hierarchical portfolio formation procedure, where each unit in a rm determines its portfolio
of risky activities, and then risk managers control the overall level of risk.1 A more indirect
application is to capital budgeting, i.e., rms' choice of physical investments. Consider,
for example, the decision to build a production plant, and suppose that the plant's design
(which can be viewed as a \portfolio" of attributes) should depend signicantly on the
specic mix of products that will be manufactured in the plant. A design proposed to
headquarters by the organization's manufacturing department might then be suboptimal,
because it might be missing important marketing information. Such interactions between
manufacturing and marketing, or between dierent manufacturing departments, seem quite
common in practice.2
To solve the organization design problem, we must make an assumption on the proba-
bility distribution of factor loadings as of the design stage. We rst consider the simple case
where factor loadings are i.i.d. across assets, with mean zero. Agents' optimal decision rules
are then myopic as described in Sharpe (1985), i.e., agents form their portfolios ignoring
interactions with assets outside the portfolios. Under these decision rules, the organization's
investment in a particular asset diers from the rst-best investment, as long as the agent
at the top of the hierarchy does not examine the asset directly. This is because the top
agent needs to adjust the investment in the asset to take into account interactions ignored
1For a general presentation of risk management and value at risk, see, for example, Litterman (1996),
Alexander (1998), and Jorion (2000). Ch.9 in Alexander and ch.16 in Jorion emphasize, in particular, that
while risk managers set limits for the level of risk that each unit in a rm can take, they do not dictate the
portfolio of a unit's risky activities. For the notion that the portfolios formed by dierent units in a rm
may fail to be globally optimal, see also Naik and Yadav (2001). These authors nd that dealers in the
London Stock Exchange control their inventories without fully taking into account the covariance with the
inventories of other dealers in the same rm.
2Bower (1970) presents four detailed case studies of capital budgeting in a large corporation. Closest
to our discussion is the case on Specialty Plastics, where a proposal for a new plant was formulated by
engineers in one manufacturing department. The proposal was not very successful, and one reason was that
although the engineers had consulted with divisional headquarters, they had not consulted suciently with
their marketing department, or with other manufacturing departments that could benet from using the
plant.
3by his subordinates. Since he has only aggregated information, however, his adjustment is
imperfect.
Given the optimal decision rules, we can evaluate the performance of dierent hierar-
chical structures. Quite surprisingly, in the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents have
one subordinate. The intuition is that for independent factor loadings, the average factor
loading of even a small set of assets diers signicantly from the factor loading of each
asset in the set. Therefore, aggregation results in a loss of useful information, even when it
concerns only a few assets. As a result, it is optimal for the top agent to examine directly
as many assets as possible.
In the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents work at full capacity, handling exactly
K assets or portfolios. Only one agent may work below capacity, due to integer constraints.
Interestingly, this agent can be at any hierarchical level. Interpreting this agent as a low
ability agent, who can handle fewer than K assets or portfolios, our result implies that
returns to ability are independent of the hierarchical level. Intuitively, the benet of the
top agent working at full capacity is that he can process more disaggregated information,
while the corresponding benet for the bottom agent is that he can take more interactions
into account. For independent factor loadings, these turn out to be equal.
When factor loadings are not i.i.d., the organization design problem becomes more
complicated, and we solve it only in some special cases. We rst assume that factor loadings
are the sum of a component common to all assets, and an i.i.d. component. We show that
the one-subordinate result of the i.i.d. case still holds, but returns to ability are highest
at the bottom of the hierarchy. We next consider an example where assets are partitioned
into groups, and factor loadings are the sum of a group and an i.i.d. component. The
one-subordinate result holds again, which is perhaps more surprising than in the i.i.d. and
common component cases. Indeed, one would expect the loss from information aggregation
to decrease if the top agent has multiple subordinates, each examining assets in one group.
One feature of actual organizations which is not captured in our model, and which might
explain why agents have multiple subordinates, is that there are returns to specialization.
In investment rms, for example, it is ecient to assign all stocks within an industry sector
to a single analyst, so that the analyst can develop expertise on that sector. To capture
returns to specialization, we consider our group component example, with the modication
that agents observe factor loadings imperfectly. This ensures that knowing an asset's factor
loading is useful when observing factor loadings of other assets in the same group. We then
4show that it is optimal for the top agent to have multiple subordinates, and that returns to
ability are highest at the top of the hierarchy. These results are, of course, derived in the
context of an example, but they suggest an interesting direction to extend the model.
This paper belongs to a large literature that studies organizations with boundedly ratio-
nal agents, and abstracts from incentive issues.3 Cr emer (1980), Aoki (1986), and Geanakop-
los and Milgrom (1991), study resource allocation in organizations, using the team-theoretic
approach of Marschak and Radner (1972). We also use this approach in the derivation of
agents' optimal decision rules. The main dierence with these papers is that we consider
hierarchical communication, where an agent's information comes from his subordinates.
Radner (1993) considers a model with hierarchical communication. He assumes that
an organization performs an associative operation involving many items. An agent needs
one unit of time to perform the operation on two items. Decentralizing the operation to a
hierarchy of agents, where agents communicate partial results to their superiors, is valuable
because it reduces the time it takes to process all the items. Van Zandt (1999b) extends
Radner's \batch processing" framework to \real-time processing", where items arrive in
each period, and the organization has to select which items to process.4 Beckmann (1960,
1983) and Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983) are precursor papers that restrict attention to
balanced hierarchies, where all agents at a given level have the same number of subordinates.
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) assume that decentralization is valuable not because it
reduces delay, but because it allows agents to specialize by processing the same type of
items more frequently. These papers, however, consider associative operations, where there
is no aggregation loss and no interactions.5
Garicano (2000) and Beggs (2001) consider hierarchical communication in organizations
that handle heterogeneous tasks. Tasks that cannot be handled by agents at a given level,
are sent one level up, where agents can either handle a larger set of tasks (Beggs), or
specialize in handling less frequent tasks (Garicano). In these papers, however, tasks can
be handled independently, and thus there are no interactions.
Harris and Raviv (2001) assume interactions between activities, and examine how these
determine the structure (matrix, functional, or divisional) that an organization should
3For a survey of this literature, see Van Zandt (1999a).
4The batch and real-time processing models have been applied to a number of organizational issues such
as returns to scale (Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Van Zandt and Radner (2001)), resource allocation (Van
Zandt (2000a, 2000b)), returns to ability (Prat (1997)), and internal structure (Orbay (2002)).
5Consider, for example, the selection of the best project out of a pool, i.e., the maximum operation.
There is no aggregation loss because the best project out of a subset is a \sucient statistic" for all the
projects in the subset. There are no interactions because the best project out of a subset does not depend
on the quality of the projects outside the subset.
5adopt. Hart and Moore (2000) also emphasize interactions in their theory of allocation
of decision rights within a rm. These papers, however, adopt a reduced-form approach in
modelling interactions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
considers the case where factor loadings are i.i.d., and Section 4 considers the general case.
Section 5 concludes, and all proofs are in two Appendices.
2 The Model
We consider an organization that forms an asset portfolio, over three periods, 0, 1, and 2. In
period 0, the organization is designed. In period 1, the assets' factor loadings are randomly
drawn, and the organization forms its portfolio in a way that depends on its design. Finally,
in period 2, the assets pay o. We rst describe the assets in which the organization can
invest, and then the organization designer's objective, constraints, and choice variables.
2.1 Assets
There is one riskless and N risky assets. The return on the riskless asset is zero. The
returns on the risky assets follow a simple factor structure. Asset n, n = 1;::;N, returns
rn = n + n + n; (1)
where n is a constant,  an aggregate factor (e.g., the business cycle), n asset n's factor
loading (the sensitivity to the factor), and n asset n's idiosyncratic risk. The idiosyncratic
risk is independent across assets, and is independent of the aggregate factor. Both the
aggregate factor and the idiosyncratic risk have mean zero, and thus n is asset n's expected
return.6
In addition to assuming a simple factor structure, we assume the following. First, 
and fngn=1;::;N are normal, and thus portfolio choice can be reduced to a mean-variance
problem. Second, all assets have the same expected return and idiosyncratic variance, i.e.,
n =  and E(2
n) = 2 for all n. Assets thus dier only in their factor loadings. Finally,
E(2) = 2, which is without loss of generality, since we can redene the factor loadings.
6The assumption of only one aggregate factor is for notational simplicity. The analysis can easily be
generalized to multiple factors.
62.2 Organization Designer's Objective
We assume that in period 0, the organization designer knows  and 2. (He does not know,
however, the factor loadings fngn=1;::;N, which are randomly drawn according to some
probability distribution in period 1.) The organization designer maximizes the expected
utility of the organization's period 2 asset payos where, for simplicity, utility is exponential
with CARA a. Since the organization designer evaluates expected utility in period 0, the








where xn denotes the organization's investment in risky asset n, and W the organization's
initial wealth. Setting, for simplicity, W = 0, and using equation (1), we can write the


























Taking expectations w.r.t.  and fngn=1;::;N, which are independent and normal, we can





























where the expectation is now w.r.t. fngn=1;::;N only. Equation (2) represents the organi-
zation designer's objective. This objective takes an intuitive form. For a given set of factor
loadings, the organization designer takes into consideration the mean and the variance of
the organization's portfolio. The mean is equal to
PN
n=1 xn, while the variance is the sum
of two terms. First, a term which corresponds to aggregate risk, and depends on the factor
loading of the organization's portfolio (
PN
n=1 xnn), and second, a term which corresponds
to idiosyncratic risk.
2.3 Organization Designer's Constraints
The organization designer is subject to three constraints.
Communication Constraint: We assume that (i) the organization must have a hi-
erarchical structure, and (ii) communication must take place along hierarchical lines, from
7the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. We represent the agents in a hierarchy by sequences
of positive integers. The agent at the top corresponds to the null sequence, \". His rst
subordinate, starting from the left, corresponds to the sequence 1, his second subordinate
to the sequence 2, and so on. Similarly, the rst subordinate of the rst subordinate cor-
responds to the sequence 1,1, the second subordinate to the sequence 1,2, and so on. We
denote a sequence by j, and refer to the corresponding agent as agent j. We denote by
J the set of all agents. Finally, we denote by S(j) the number of (direct) subordinates of
agent j. Figure 1 illustrates the notation for a simple hierarchy.
Each agent in the hierarchy may examine some risky assets, i.e., observe their factor
loadings. We denote by M(j) the number of assets that agent j examines, and by AM(j)
their set. We assume that each asset is examined by only one agent, i.e., the sets fAM(j)gj2J
form a partition of f1;::;Ng. We refer to the assets examined by agent j, or by his direct
or indirect subordinates, as the assets under j's control. We denote by N(j) the number of
these assets, and by AN(j) their set.
Communication takes place as follows. An agent at the bottom of the hierarchy observes
the factor loadings of the assets he examines. He then forms a portfolio of these assets, and
communicates the portfolio's factor loading to his superior. The superior observes the factor
loadings of his subordinates' portfolios, and of the assets he (directly) examines. He then
forms a portfolio of all the assets under his control, and communicates the portfolio's factor
loading to his own superior. This process continues until the top of the hierarchy, and the
portfolio formed by the top agent is also that of the organization. We denote by xn(j) the





the factor loading of agent j's portfolio.
Scaling Constraint: We assume that agents cannot change the composition of their
subordinates' portfolios, but can only scale portfolios up or down, i.e., multiply the invest-
ment in each asset by the same scalar. We denote by yi(j) the scaling factor that agent j
applies to the portfolio of his ith subordinate, i = 1;::;S(j). The investment of agent j in
an asset n 2 AN(j;i) is thus xn(j) = yi(j)xn(j;i).
Processing Constraint: We assume that agents can form a portfolio of at most K < 1
inputs, where an input can be either an asset agents (directly) examine, or a subordinate's
8portfolio.7 The processing constraint for agent j is
S(j) + M(j)  K: (3)
The processing constraint is fundamental to the organization design problem, since in
its absence (i.e., if K = 1) the organization would trivially consist of only one agent.
This constraint might be capturing agents' limitations in collecting information, i.e., ob-
serving assets' factor loadings, and learning portfolios' factor loadings from subordinates.
Alternatively, it might be capturing agents' limitations in processing the information. Both
types of limitations seem quite important in practice.8 The communication and scaling
constraints capture some features of the portfolio formation process in investment rms.
Needless to say, it would be desirable to derive these features endogenously. In Section 4,
we show that in some cases, the scaling constraint can indeed be endogenized. We also
discuss generalizations of the communication constraint.
2.4 Organization Designer's Choice Variables
The organization designer can choose three aspects of the organization, all of which can
inuence the portfolio the organization forms in period 1.
Hierarchical Structure: The organization designer can choose any hierarchical struc-
ture satisfying the processing constraint (3).
Assignment of Assets to Agents: The organization designer can choose which assets
each agent examines. Of course, this choice is trivial when the assets are identical ex-ante,
i.e., as of period 0.
Agents' Decision Rules: The organization designer can choose the decision rules that
agents use when forming their portfolios. A decision rule for agent j is a mapping from j's






7Note that treating a subordinate's portfolio as a single asset is consistent with the communication and
scaling constraints. Indeed, under the communication constraint, an agent's information on a subordinate's
portfolio is only the factor loading, as in the case of a single asset. Moreover, under the scaling constraint,
the agent's control on the portfolio is only the scaling factor, i.e., is one-dimensional as for a single asset.
8For example, in his presentation of risk management, Litterman (1996) states that: \The choice of how
nely to disaggregate the data is a compromise between accuracy of risk management, which comes from
disaggregation, and the clarity that comes from aggregation. In addition, lack of availability of data or
computing resources may limit the degree to which positions can be analyzed on a disaggregated basis."
9i.e., the factor loadings of the assets j examines, and the factor loadings of the portfolios of





i.e., investments in the assets j examines, and scaling factors for the portfolios of j's sub-
ordinates.
A given hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and decision rule for each
agent, implement a decision rule for the organization, i.e., a mapping from factor loadings
to investments by the organization. A decision rule for the organization determines, in turn,
the organization designer's expected utility, from equation (2). The organization designer's
optimization problem is to implement a decision rule for the organization that maximizes
expected utility.
2.5 First-Best
To analyze the organization designer's problem, it is useful to consider the rst-best de-
cision rule. This rule selects the investments fx
ngn=1;::;N that maximize expected utility


























Obviously, the rst-best rule maximizes expected utility. Therefore, if it is implementable
(through a choice of hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and agents'
decision rules) it is the solution to the organization designer's problem.
To gain intuition on whether the rst-best rule is implementable, we consider the simple
case where factor loadings are small. We assume, in particular, that n = `n, where  goes














where o(2)=2 goes to zero as  goes to zero.9 The rst-best investment in asset n is
equal to =a2, minus an adjustment for aggregate risk, obtained by multiplying the factor

















2 + o(1) in the RHS, we obtain equation (5).
10loading of asset n times the sum of all assets' factor loadings. Intuitively, asset n is penalized
if it is risky, and the penalty increases with the riskiness of the rest of the asset portfolio.
When factor loadings are deterministic, the rst-best rule is easily implementable. The
organization designer can, for example, instruct agents to choose investments equal to x
n
for each asset n they examine, and scaling factors equal to 1. This implements the rst-best
rule, for any hierarchical structure and assignment of assets to agents.
When factor loadings are stochastic, the rst-best rule is generally not implementable.
The organization designer cannot, for example, instruct an agent to choose x
n, since x
n
depends on the factor loadings of all assets, which are generally not all known by any single
agent. For example, an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, who examines asset n, knows
n, but generally not the factor loading of the rest of the asset portfolio. The agent's
hierarchical superiors have better aggregate information on the portfolio's factor loading,
but do not have the disaggregated information on n.
When the rst-best rule is not implementable, the organization designer's problem con-
sists in implementing a second-best rule. This problem is potentially very complicated, since
it involves optimization over a large, discrete set of hierarchical structures and assignments
of assets to agents, and also over an innite set of agents' decision rules. In Sections 3 and
4, we solve this problem in a number of special cases.
3 I.I.D. Factor Loadings
In this section, we solve the organization designer's problem in the special case where
factor loadings are small, and i.i.d. with mean zero. The small factor loadings assumption
(n = `n, where  goes to zero and the probability distribution of f`ngn=1;::;N is held
constant) greatly simplies the problem, while preserving many of the economic insights.
The independence assumption also simplies the problem, and provides a useful benchmark
for the more general analysis in Section 4. Finally, the assumption that factor loadings have
mean zero is only for notational simplicity and does not aect the results.
Since factor loadings are i.i.d., the assets are identical ex-ante. Therefore, the assignment
of assets to agents does not matter, and the organization designer's only choice variables are
the hierarchical structure and agents' decision rules. We rst determine agents' optimal de-
cision rules for a general hierarchical structure, and then determine the optimal hierarchical
structure.
113.1 Agents' Decision Rules
To simplify the derivation of agents' optimal decision rules, we assume that these are smooth,
in the sense of having a Taylor expansion of order two around  = 0. For  = 0, the rst-
best investment in each asset is =a2, from equation (5). This can be implemented by
decision rules where agents invest =a2 in each asset they examine, and set scaling factors
equal to 1.
Assumption 1 There exists a selection of optimal decision rules, parametrized by , such





1 + fn(j) + o(2)

;
for n 2 AM(j), and
yi(j) = 1 + gi(j) + o(2);
for i = 1;::;S(j), where fn(j) and gi(j) contain rst- and second-degree terms in (j) and
.10





Intuitively, (j) represents the factor loading of agent j's portfolio for small . Indeed, since
for small  all assets in the portfolio receive approximately the same investment =a2, the






n + o(1) =

a2(j) + o(1):
Proposition 1 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. Then, there exists
a selection of optimal decision rules such that for each agent j, xn(j) and yi(j) are as in
Assumption 1 with





[(j)   (j;i)] + o(2):
10We consider a selection of optimal decision rules, rather than the optimal rules, because optimal rules
are not unique. The non-uniqueness is in the trivial sense that we can multiply an agent's investments by a
scalar, and divide the scaling factor of the agent's superior by the same scalar.
12To illustrate Proposition 1, we consider the hierarchical structure in Figure 1. Equation






1   1(1 + 2 + 3 + 4) + o(2)

:
Consider now the organization's investment in asset 1. The investment of agent 1,1, who is











1   1(1 + 2) + o(2)

: (6)
Intuitively, agent 1,1 attempts to replicate the rst-best investment, but does not know the
factor loadings 3 and 4. He replaces these with his best guess, which is zero since factor
loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. Agent 1 scales agent 1,1's investment by




3 + o(2): (7)












Intuitively, agent 1 adjusts agent 1,1's investment to take into account the factor loading 3,
that he knows but agent 1,1 does not. Unlike agent 1,1, however, agent 1 does not know 1,
and replaces it by his best guess, which is (1 +2)=2. (Agent 1's only information on 1 is
the factor loading of agent 1,1's portfolio, which for small  is 1+2. Since factor loadings
are i.i.d., agent 1's expectation of 1 conditional on 1 + 2 is (1 + 2)=2.) Proceeding as














The top agent adjusts agent 1's investment to take into account 4. He has, however, to
replace 1 by his best guess, which is (1 + 2 + 3)=3.
The dierence between the organization's investment in an asset n, xn, and the rst-best
investment, x
n, reects the organization's decision-making error. Dening the error, en, for
asset n as the lowest order term in (xn   x
n)=(















13The error for asset 1 is the sum of two errors, one associated with agent 1 and one with
the top agent. Each of these errors takes an intuitive form as the product of two terms, an
interaction term and an aggregation loss term. The interaction term reects the fact that
an agent adjusts a subordinate's investment to take into account interactions with assets
whose factor loadings the subordinate does not know. For example, the interaction term
for agent 1 is 3, because this agent takes into account the interaction with asset 3. The
aggregation loss term reects the fact that when adjusting a subordinate's investment, an
agent has only aggregate information, which is imperfect. For example, the aggregation loss





This is because when adjusting his subordinate's investment, agent 1 does not know the
factor loading of asset 1, 1, and replaces it by the average factor loading of assets 1 and 2,
(1 + 2)=2.
It is worth emphasizing that Proposition 1 determines agents' optimal decision rules
for any given hierarchical structure. Furthermore, these rules are myopic as described in
Sharpe (1985), i.e., agents form their portfolios ignoring interactions with assets outside the
portfolios. Using Proposition 1, we now proceed to evaluate the performance of dierent
hierarchical structures, and determine the optimal structure.
3.2 Hierarchical Structure
An optimal hierarchical structure must maximize the organization designer's expected util-
ity. For small factor loadings, expected utility takes a simple form.






Equation (9) is a sum over assets of the expected squared error for each asset (where
expectation is w.r.t. the factor loadings). This measures the distance between the organiza-
tion's decision rule and the rst-best decision rule. An optimal hierarchical structure must
minimize this distance. We should emphasize that, unlike all other results in Section 3, this
result does not require i.i.d. factor loadings.
In Lemma 2, we compute the sum of expected squared errors for a general hierarchical
structure, and i.i.d. factor loadings.
14Lemma 2 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero, and agents follow the














The intuition behind equation (10) is as follows. Consider an agent j, and an asset n in
the portfolio of j's ith subordinate (agent j;i). The component of the error for asset n, that
is associated with agent j, is the product of an interaction and an aggregation loss term.
The interaction term is the sum of the factor loadings of the N(j)   N(j;i) assets that are




The aggregation loss term is the factor loading of asset n minus the average factor loading




















Multiplying the expected squared interaction and aggregation loss terms by the N(j;i)
assets in j;i's portfolio, and summing over i and j, we obtain equation (10).
In Proposition 2, we characterize optimal hierarchical structures.
Proposition 2 Suppose that factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero. In any optimal
hierarchical structure:
i. agents must have one subordinate (except the bottom agent),
ii. agents must handle exactly K assets or portfolios, except at most one agent.
The rst, and somewhat surprising, result of Proposition 2 is that in an optimal hierar-
chical structure, agents have only one subordinate. To explain the intuition, we consider the
hierarchical structures H1 and H2 in Figure 2. Both hierarchical structures are for N = 4
and K = 2, and according to Proposition 2, H1 is optimal.
15The main advantage of H1 over H2 is that it selects a better investment in asset 4.
Indeed, in both H1 and H2, it is the top agent who adjusts the investment in asset 4 to
take into account the interaction with assets 1 and 2. In H1, however, the top agent knows
the exact factor loading of asset 4, while in H2 he only knows the average factor loading of
assets 3 and 4. Therefore, the aggregation loss term (associated with asset 4 and the top
agent) is zero in H1, but non-zero in H2. Conversely, the disadvantage of H1 over H2 is
that it selects worse investments in assets 1 and 2. Indeed, in both H1 and H2, it is the top
agent who adjusts the investments in assets 1 and 2 to take into account the interaction
with asset 4. In H2, however, the top agent knows the average factor loading of assets 1
and 2, while in H1 he only knows the average factor loading of assets 1, 2, and 3. Therefore,
the aggregation loss term (associated with assets 1 or 2, and the top agent) is larger in H1
than in H2.
The reason why H1 dominates H2 is that for independent factor loadings, the benet
of knowing an exact factor loading instead of an average (as is the case for asset 4) exceeds
the cost of knowing an average that is less precise (as is the case for assets 1 and 2). In
other words, the average of two independent factor loadings is not much closer to one factor
loading, than is the average of three or more, i.e., the aggregation loss term is not much
larger for three than for two assets. Indeed, the expected squared aggregation loss term is
a(N) = [(N   1)=N]2
. The function a(N) is maximum for N = 1, and achieves half of
its maximum value for N = 2.
In Table 1, we compute the expected squared errors for H1 and H2 (omitting 4
, for no-
tational simplicity). Table 1 conrms that H1 dominates H2 because the better investment
in asset 4 outweighs the worse investments in assets 1 and 2.
Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 Asset 4 Sum
H1 7/6 7/6 2/3 0 3
H2 1 1 1 1 4
Table 1: Expected squared errors for H1 and H2.
The second result of Proposition 2 is that in an optimal hierarchical structure, all agents
except perhaps one work at full capacity, handling exactly K assets or portfolios. The
intuition is simply that the decentralization of information processing, which arises from
the processing constraint, reduces decision quality. Therefore, it is optimal to minimize
decentralization, by making the processing constraint binding.
16An agent working below capacity may exist only because of integer constraints. When,
for example, N = 4 and K = 3, the optimal hierarchical structures (Ha and Hb, shown in
Figure 3) consist of two agents, only one of whom works at full capacity. By contrast, when
N = 5 and K = 3, both agents work at full capacity.
The existence of an agent working below capacity oers one way to get at the question
of how returns to ability depend on the hierarchical level. Indeed, an agent working below
capacity can be interpreted as a low ability agent, who can handle fewer than K assets or
portfolios. Such an agent should be at the hierarchical level where returns to ability are the
smallest.
Interestingly, Proposition 2 shows that an agent working below capacity can be at any
hierarchical level. When, for example, N = 4 and K = 3, such an agent can be either
at the bottom of the hierarchy (in Ha) or at the top (in Hb). This means that returns to
ability are independent of the hierarchical level. In other words, the benet of placing a
high ability agent at the top of the hierarchy (the agent can process more disagreggated
information) is equal to the benet of placing the agent at the bottom (the agent can form
a better portfolio, taking interactions with more assets into account).
4 Generalizations and Extensions
In this section, we study the organization designer's problem when factor loadings are not
i.i.d., and we examine how the results of the i.i.d. case can generalize. We rst characterize
agents' optimal decision rules for a general hierarchical structure and probability distribu-
tion of factor loadings. We next solve the organization designer's problem for two specic
probability distributions, and also in an extension of the model that incorporates returns to
specialization. Finally, we discuss ways to relax the communication and scaling constraints.
4.1 Agents' Decision Rules
Before presenting the general characterization of agents' optimal decision rules, we show
that these can be computed explicitly when the hierarchical structure and probability distri-
bution of factor loadings satisfy a \sucient statistic" condition. To state this condition, we
denote by H(j) agent j's subordinate hierarchy (consisting of j, and j's direct and indirect











to represent agent j's information, both for small . Finally, we denote by I(j) the infor-
mation set generated by  (j), and by  I(j) that generated by f (j0)gj02J(j).





= E [c(j)jI(j)]: (12)
Condition 1 requires that the agents in j's subordinate hierarchy have no incremental
information, relative to agent j, on the factor loading of the portfolio of assets outside the
subordinate hierarchy. In other words, agent j knows aggregate information concerning
the rest of organization, at least as well as his subordinates. Condition 1 is satised for
independent factor loadings, since the factor loading of an asset outside a subordinate
hierarchy is independent of the information of the agents in that hierarchy. Condition 1 is
also satised for two-level hierarchies, since the only agent with a non-trivial subordinate
hierarchy is the top agent. We will show that it is satised in other cases of interest as well.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Condition 1 holds. Then, there exists a selection of optimal
decision rules such that for each agent j, xn(j) and yi(j) are as in Assumption 1 with



















E [c(j)jI(j)] + o(2):
To illustrate Proposition 3, we consider again the hierarchical structure in Figure 1. The











E [3 + 4jI(1;1)] + o(2)

:
Compared to the case where factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero (equation (6)), there is
a new term, involving agent 1,1's conditional expectation of 3 +4. This term reects the
fact that agent 1,1 has information on assets 3 and 4, and can adjust his investment to take
into account the interaction with these assets. The adjustment consists of two components.
The rst is simply
 1E [3 + 4jI(1;1)];




E [3 + 4jI(1;1)];
and can be interpreted as a scaling factor for agent 1,1's portfolio, since it is the same for
asset 2 as for asset 1. Agent 1,1 chooses this scaling factor so that his portfolio contains no
overall adjustment for the interaction with assets 3 and 4 (i.e., the adjustments in assets
1 and 2 sum to zero). Intuitively, agent 1,1's portfolio can be better adjusted for the
interaction with assets 3 and 4 by that agent's superior, agent 1, whose information on
3 + 4 is more accurate.
The scaling factor of agent 1 is








1 + 2 + 3
3

E [4jI(1)] + o(2):
Compared to the i.i.d. case (equation (7)), there is again a new term, reecting an adjust-
ment for the interaction with asset 4.
The error for asset 1 is equal to that in the i.i.d. case (equation (8)), plus the new terms











1 + 2 + 3
3

[4   E [4jI(1)]]:
This equation is similar to that in the i.i.d. case, and it generalizes nicely the analysis of
that case. As in the i.i.d. case, the error for asset 1 is the sum of errors associated to agent
1 and the top agent, and each error is the product of an interaction and an aggregation loss
term. The aggregation loss term is exactly as in the i.i.d. case. The interaction term takes
a more general form, and reects the incremental information that an agent has relative to
a subordinate, on the assets that are not under the subordinate's control. For example, the
interaction term for agent 1 is
3 + E [4jI(1)]   E [3 + 4jI(1;1)];
and reects the incremental information agent 1 has relative to agent 1,1, on assets 3 and
4.
It is worth emphasizing how Condition 1 simplies the analysis. In our example, Condi-
tion 1 requires that agent 1,1 has no incremental information on asset 4, relative to agent 1.
This ensures that agent 1,1 performs no overall adjustment of his portfolio for the interaction
19with asset 4, but leaves this to agent 1. If, by contrast, agent 1,1 had incremental infor-
mation, he would perform part of the adjustment. In that case, however, each agent would
have to base his adjustment on that of the other agent. This would involve a complicated
analysis of what an agent knows, what he knows the other knows, etc.
While Condition 1 is useful for simplifying the optimal decision rules, it is not needed
for characterizing them. In Theorem 1 (stated in the Appendix) we show that optimal
decision rules can be characterized through a set of rst-order conditions for each agent.
The rst-order conditions for agent j are
E[enjI(j)] = 0; (13)











5 = 0; (14)
for i = 1;::;S(j), where en is the error for asset n. The intuition is that agent j must not be
able to reduce the sum of expected squared errors, by changing the investment in an asset
he examines, or the scaling factor of a subordinate's portfolio. This general characterization
does not require Condition 1. Rather, Condition 1 is useful because it allows us to nd a
simple solution to the rst-order conditions.
4.2 The Common Component Case
One way to introduce correlation in factor loadings is to assume that they are the sum
of a component which is common to all assets, and an i.i.d. component. This captures
the notion that the determinants of an asset's factor loading are either economy-wide, or
asset-specic. We set n =  + n, where  denotes the common component, n the i.i.d.
component, and  and fngn=1;::;N are independent. For notational simplicity, we assume
that  and fngn=1;::;N have mean zero. We also assume that they are normal, so that
Condition 1 holds. Indeed, under normality, the sum of factor loadings over a set A is
a sucient statistic, relative to all factor loadings in A, for the common component .
Therefore, it is also a sucient statistic for the sum of factor loadings over the complement
of A.
Since assets are ex-ante identical, the assignment of assets to agents does not matter,
and we only need to determine the optimal hierarchical structure. We rst compute the
sum of expected squared errors for a general hierarchical structure.
20Lemma 3 Suppose that n =  + n, where   N(0;2
), n  N(0;2
), and all variables










[N(j;i)   1][N(j)   N(j;i)]
[1 + rN(j;i)][1 + rN(j)]
; (15)
where r  2
=2
.
Equation (15) generalizes equation (10) of the i.i.d. case. Using equation (15), we can
determine the optimal hierarchical structure.
Proposition 4 Suppose that n =  + n, where   N(0;2
), n  N(0;2
), and all
variables are independent. In any optimal hierarchical structure:
i. agents must have one subordinate (except the bottom agent),
ii. agents must handle exactly K assets or portfolios, except at most the top agent.
The optimal hierarchical structure is as in in the i.i.d. case: agents have only one subor-
dinate, and work at full capacity except perhaps one. As in the i.i.d. case, the intuition for
the one subordinate result is that aggregation loss is large even for two assets. The com-
mon component does not aect the aggregation loss term, since this term is the dierence
between one factor loading and an average of factor loadings.
The only dierence with the i.i.d. case concerns the position of an agent working below
capacity. While in the i.i.d. case such an agent can be at any hierarchical level, in the
common component case he can be only at the top. This means that returns to ability
are highest at the bottom of the hierarchy. Intuitively, the benet of placing a high ability
agent at the top is that he can process more disagreggated information. This benet is the
same as in the i.i.d. case, since the aggregation loss term is the same. By contrast, the
benet of placing a high ability agent at the bottom is larger than in the i.i.d. case. Indeed,
a high ability agent can examine more assets, and so obtain more accurate information on
the common component. Therefore, he can better take into account the interactions with
the assets he does not examine, and so form a better portfolio.
4.3 The Group Component Case
An alternative way to introduce correlation in factor loadings is to assume that they are
the sum of a component which is common to all assets in a given group, and an i.i.d.
21component. Groups may, for example, correspond to industries or countries. When assets
are sorted into groups, they are not identical ex-ante (in particular, not in relation to
other assets). Therefore, the assignment of assets to agents matters, and the organization
designer's problem becomes more complicated. To gain some insights on the solution, we
consider a simple example where there are N = 4 assets, each agent can process K = 2
assets, and there are two groups, one consisting of assets 1 and 2, and the other of assets 3
and 4. We set n = 12 + n, for n = 1;2, and n = 34 + n, for n = 3;4, where the group
components 12 and 34 are i.i.d., and are independent of the i.i.d. components fngn=1;::;4.
We also assume that all variables are mean zero and normal.
There are four possible combinations of hierarchical structures and assignments of assets
to agents, illustated in Figure 4. First, the one-subordinate homogeneous hierarchy, H1, in
which each agent has one subordinate, and the bottom agent examines assets in the same
group. Second, the one-subordinate heterogeneous hierarchy, ^ H1, which diers from H1
in that the bottom agent examines one asset in each group. Third, the two-subordinate
homogeneous hierarchy, H2, in which the top agent has two subordinates, each of whom
examines assets in the same group. Finally, the two-subordinate heterogeneous hierarchy,
^ H2, which diers from H2 in that subordinates examine one asset in each group.
Proposition 5 Suppose that N = 4, K = 2, n = 12 + n for n = 1;2, and n = 34 + n
for n = 3;4, where 12;34  N(0;2
), n  N(0;2
), and all variables are independent.
Then, H2 is equivalent to ^ H2, and both are dominated by H1.
Proposition 5 implies that an one-subordinate hierarchy is optimal. This result is the
same as in the independent and common component cases, but it is even more surprising
in the group component case. Consider, for example, the hierarchies H1 and H2. In the
absence of a group component, H1 dominates H2 because it is preferable that the top agent
knows an exact factor loading and an aggregate of three, rather than two aggregates of two.
In the presence of a group component, however, one might expect H2 to dominate. This is
because the aggregates in H2 are formed by two assets in the same group, and thus involve
little loss of information, while the aggregate in H1 is formed by three assets, not all in the
same group. The reason why H1 still dominates is that the aggregate of three assets is not
as relevant, because some of the top agent's tasks are performed by agent 1. Indeed, since
assets 3 and 4 are in the same group, agent 1 has some information on 4, which he can
use to adjust his investments for the interaction with asset 4.11
11The intuition why H2 and ^ H2 are equivalent goes along similar lines. The advantage of H2 is that the
224.4 Returns to Specialization
The result that one-subordinate hierarchies are optimal seems contrary to the way many
actual organizations are structured. In investment rms, for example, many industry sector
analysts report to the same boss, who is in charge of the overall stock portfolio. One
feature of actual organizations which is not captured in our model is that there are returns
to specialization. Sector analysts, for example, have expertise in their sector, enabling
them to analyze the sector stocks better than other analysts. In this section, we show that
our model can be extended to incorporate returns to specialization. Furthermore, in the
presence of such returns, one-subordinate hierarchies are no longer optimal, and returns to
ability can be highest at the top of the hierarchy.
To model returns to specialization, we consider the example of Section 4.3, with one
modication. We assume that when an agent examines an asset, he has only the time to
learn either the group component, or the i.i.d. component, but not both. The reason why
this implies returns to specialization is as follows. Suppose that an agent examines an asset,
and chooses to learn the group component. Then, if this agent examines a second asset in
the same group, he does not need to learn the group component again. Therefore, he can
learn the i.i.d. component, and so be fully informed about the second asset.12
To obtain the returns to specialization, it is important to endogenize agents' choice of
which information to learn on each asset they examine. Consequently, we treat this choice
as part of the solution to the organization designer's problem. We solve this problem in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Suppose that N = 4, K = 2, n = 12 + n for n = 1;2, and n = 34 + n
for n = 3;4, where 12;34  N(0;2
), n  N(0;2
), and all variables are independent.
Then, if 2
=2
 is suciently large, it is optimal that agents know the group components for
the assets they examine. Furthermore, H2 dominates H1, ^ H1, and ^ H2.
Proposition 6 implies that if returns to specialization are important (in the sense that
the variance of the group component is suciently large), then the top agent should have
two subordinates, each of whom examines two assets in the same group. The intuition
aggregates are formed by assets in the same group, and thus involve little loss of information. The advantage
of ^ H2, on the other hand, is that the bottom agents can perform some of the top agent's tasks because they
have some information on the assets not under their control.
12An alternative way to model returns to specialization is to assume that agents can only observe noisy
signals of the factor loadings of the assets they examine. Then, an agent examining two assets in the same
group has more information on the group component, and so can estimate more accurately each asset's
factor loading. We do not model returns to specialization through noisy signals, however, because this is
less tractable.
23is as follows. Because the group component has a large variance, it represents valuable
information, and thus agents should know the group components for the assets they examine.
Given this, the only way for the organization to obtain some information on the i.i.d.
components is that assets in each group are examined by the same agent.
Since returns to specialization aect the optimal hierarchical structure, it is interesting
to know whether they also aect the returns to ability. To examine this, we modify the
previous example by introducing a third group of two assets (assets 5 and 6), and a high
ability agent who can process four assets, instead of two as the other agents. We can then
show13 that if returns to specialization are important, the high ability agent should be at
the top of the hierarchy, examine two assets in the same group, and have two subordinates
also examining two assets in the same group. (Hierarchy HA, illustrated in gure 5.) The
intuition why the high ability agent should be at the top rather the bottom (as, for example,
in hierarchy HB) is that he can perform the high-level task of adjusting investment in each
group for the interaction with the other groups, leaving to his subordinates (part of) the
low-level task of selecting within-group investments.
4.5 Communication and Scaling Constraints
In our model, portfolio formation is subject to the communication constraint, namely, (i)
agents form their portfolios by combining the portfolios of their hierarchical subordinates
and the assets they examine, and (ii) agents' information concerns only the above portfolios
and assets. One way to generalize this constraint is to relax (ii), and allow agents to
obtain information on portfolios or assets elsewhere in the hierarchy. If agents can obtain
information only on the portfolios of those at lower hierarchical levels (i.e., their subordinates
or the subordinates of their hierarchical peers), then the organization's portfolio is still
formed in a single iteration, going from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. If, by
contrast, agents can also obtain information on the portfolios of their peers or superiors, then
portfolio formation generally involves multiple iterations. For example, the organization can
form a trial portfolio, then the top agent can communicate information on this portfolio to
the bottom agents, so that a second trial portfolio can be formed, etc. We expect the analysis
and the results of the single iteration case to be similar to the ones in this paper. However,
the analysis of the multiple iteration case might be substantially more complicated.
An additional constraint that we impose on portfolio formation is the scaling constraint,
13The proof is available upon request.
24namely, agents cannot change the composition of their subordinates' portfolios, but can only
scale the portfolios up or down. This constraint follows, in some cases, from agents' optimal
behavior. Indeed, when the assets in the portfolio of an agent's subordinate are identical
conditional on the agent's information (as in the independent and common component
cases), then it is optimal for the agent not to change the composition of the subordinate's
portfolio.14
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of organizational decision making, in which information pro-
cessing is decentralized. The model's novel elements are that aggregation entails a loss of
useful information, and agents' decision problems interact. These elements seem important
in many organizational settings. One such setting, from which our model is motivated, is
portfolio selection in investment rms.
In our model, an organization forms a portfolio of risky assets. Portfolio formation
is hiearchical: agents combine their subordinates' portfolios and any assets they examine
directly into larger portfolios, and communicate information on these portfolios to their
superiors. Agents' ability to process information is limited, in that they can combine only
a limited number of inputs into a portfolio.
We determine the hierarchical structure, assignment of assets to agents, and agents'
decision rules that maximize the quality of organizational decisions. In the cases we examine,
the optimal hierarchical structure has a chain form, where all agents have one subordinate.
Furthermore, returns to ability are at least as high at the bottom as at the top of the
hierarchy.
One interesting extension is to introduce returns to specialization. This extension is
quite realistic, and in the example we examine in this paper, it reverses the one-subordinate
result, as well as the result on returns to ability. Other possible extensions are to allow assets
to dier in their expected returns, and to consider alternative probability distributions for
the factor loadings. In particular, it might be interesting to introduce multiple group
components (corresponding, for example, to an asset's industry sector and country). This
would raise the question of along which criterion assets should be grouped, a question
that has received attention by investment management practitioners. (See, for example,
14Formally, in the absence of the scaling constraint, the rst-order condition (13) must hold for all assets
in AN(j), instead of AM(j). When assets in AN(j;i) are identical conditonal on j's information, E[enjI(j)]
is the same for all n 2 AN(j;i). Therefore, equation (14) implies (13) for all n 2 AN(j;i).
25Gunn (2000).) At a more abstract level, studying optimal grouping might be relevant for
understanding whether organizations should be structured according to functions (U-form),
products (M-form), or in a hybrid fashion (matrix form).
26Appendix
Due to space limitations, this Appendix does not contain the proofs of Propositions
4-6. These proofs are in a separate Appendix, available on the Review of Economic Studies
website.
We rst state and prove Theorem 1 (referred to at the end of Section 4.1). To state
the theorem, we introduce some notation. For an asset n, we denote by jn the agent who
examines the asset, i.e., who satises n 2 AM(jn), and by Jn the set of agents who can
inuence the investment in the asset, i.e., who satisfy n 2 AN(j). For an agent j 2 Jnnfjng,
we denote by in(j) the index of j's subordinate who is in Jn. The organization's investment





Given functions fFn(j)gn2AM(j) and fGi(j)gi=1;::;S(j), for each agent j, we set




Intuitively, Fn(j) and Gi(j) will represent the lowest order terms (after the order zero term)
in xn(j) and yi(j), respectively, and Fn will represent the lowest order term in xn. We denote
by F







Finally, we recall the denitions of H(j), J(j), c(j),  (j), I(j), and  I(j), given at the
beginning of Section 4.1.
Theorem 1 Suppose that for each agent j, there exist functions fFn(j)gn2AM(j) and fGi(j)gi=1;::;S(j),
which contain second-degree terms in  (j) and , and satisfy the rst-order conditions
E[Fn   F
njI(j)] = 0 (18)









5 = 0 (19)






1 + Fn(j) + o(2)

; (20)
27for n 2 AM(j), and
yi(j) = 1 + Gi(j) + o(2); (21)
for i = 1;::;S(j).






1 + ^ fn(j) + o(2)
i
; (22)
for n 2 AM(j), and
yi(j) = 1 + ^ gi(j) + o(2); (23)
for i = 1;::;S(j), where ^ fn(j) and ^ gi(j) contain rst- and second-degree terms in (j) and
. We assume initially that ^ fn(j) and ^ gi(j) contain only second-degree terms, and prove
the theorem in three steps. In a fourth step, we extend the proof to the case where ^ fn(j)
and ^ gi(j) contain also rst-degree terms.
Step 1: Denition of ^ Fn and rst-order conditions. Since in the limit when 
goes to zero, the organization's investment in each asset converges to =a2, we have
(j;i) =

a2(j;i) + o(): (24)
Therefore,
^ fn(j) = ^ Fn(j) + o(2); (25)
and
^ gi(j) = ^ Gi(j) + o(2); (26)
where ^ Fn(j) and ^ Gi(j) contain second-degree terms in  (j) and . Equations (16), (22),





1 + ^ Fn + o(2)
i
; (27)
where ^ Fn is dened from ^ Fn(j) and ^ Gi(j), as in equation (17).
We next show that the rst-order conditions (18) and (19) hold if we substitute f ^ Fngn=1;::;N
for fFngn=1;::;N. Consider the organization designer's objective, given in equation (2):
 E exp[ aQ(x)];


























Since Q is quadratic, and maximum at x  fx
ngn=1;::;N, we have




Therefore, we can write the organization designer's objective as
 E [exp[ aQ(x)]exp[R(x   x)]]: (28)
Consider n 2 AM(j), and suppose that agent j's investment in asset n is perturbed to
xn(j)(1 + h);
where  is a scalar, and h a function of (j). This changes the organization's investment
in asset n to
xn(1 + h):









This has to equal zero, by the optimality of agent j's decision rule. To derive equation
(18), we will determine the lowest order term in equation (29), for small factor loadings.








Equations (5) and (27) imply that

















+ (xn   x
n)
#
= a22( ^ Fn   F
n) + o(2):




















for some function K. Therefore, the lowest order term in h((j)) is K( 0(j)), where  0(j) 













Since this has to equal zero, we must have
E
h




for all functions K( 0(j)), i.e., for all I(j)-measurable functions. This implies equation
(18).
To derive equation (19), we proceed similarly. We suppose that agent j's scaling factor
for the portfolio of his ith subordinate is perturbed to
yi(j)(1 + h):
This changes the organization's investment in any asset n 2 AN(j;i) to
xn(1 + h):




























which implies equation (19).
Step 2: Fn = ^ Fn, for all n = 1;::;N. This means that investments by the organization
resulting from (i) decision rules of the form (20) and (21), and (ii) the optimal decision rules
























To show that Fn = ^ Fn, we will show that S = ^ S = 0. Equation (17) implies that
Fn   ^ Fn =
h





























































Therefore, S = 0, and by an identical argument, ^ S = 0.
Step 3: There exist decision rules of the form (20) and (21), which are
optimal. To show this, we will start from the optimal decision rules (22) and (23), and
construct decision rules of the form (20) and (21), without modifying the organization's
investments. Consider an agent j at the bottom of the hierarchy, and an asset n 2 AM(j).
Since Fn = ^ Fn, we have




^ Gin(j0)(j0)   Gin(j0)(j0)
i
:
The LHS of this equation is I(j)-measurable, i.e., is a function of  (j) = fngn2AM(j). The
RHS is a function of  (j0) for j0 2 Jnnfjg, and can thus depend on  (j) only through (j).
Therefore, both the LHS and the RHS are equal to a function K of (j) (and ), which, in
31addition, contains second-degree terms. Equation (24) implies that there exists a function
k, which contains second-degree terms in (j) and , such that
k = K + o(2):
Suppose that the decision rule for agent j is modied from (22) to xn(j)[1 + k] for all
n 2 AM(j), and the decision rule for j's superior, jb, is modied to yi(jb)=[1 + k], only for
the index i corresponding to j. The new decision rules are measurable w.r.t. both agents'
information, since k is a function of (j). They also leave the organization's investments
unchanged, since the change in j's investment is undone by jb. Finally, j's decision rule
becomes of the form (20), since











1 + ^ Fn(j) + o(2)
i











1 + Fn(j) + o(2)

:
Proceeding inductively to the top of the hierarchy, we can similarly modify all agents'
decision rules so that they take the form (20) and (21).
Step 4: ^ fn(j) and ^ gi(j) contain rst-degree terms. Suppose that ^ fn(j) and ^ gi(j)
contain rst-degree terms in (j) and . Then
^ fn(j) = ^ F1
n(j) + o();
and
^ gi(j) = ^ G1
i(j) + o();
where ^ F1
n(j) and ^ G1










n is dened from ^ F1
n(j) and ^ G1
i(j), as in equation (17). Proceeding as in Step
1, and noting that the rst-degree term in x
n is zero, we can show that the rst-order
conditions (18) and (19) hold if we substitute f ^ F1
ngn=1;::;N for fFngn=1;::;N, and zero for
fF
ngn=1;::;N. Since (18) and (19) obviously hold if we substitute zero for both fFngn=1;::;N
and fF
ngn=1;::;N, we can proceed as in Step 2, and show that ^ F1
n = 0 for all n = 1;::;N. We
can then modify the decision rules (22) and (23), so that they do not contain rst-degree
32terms, and yet imply the same investments by the organization. To do this, we proceed as
in Step 3. We start with an agent j at the bottom of the hierarchy and show that ^ F1
n(j)
must be a function of (j) only. We then adjust j's decision rule so that the rst-degree
terms cancel, and proceed inductively to the top of the hierarchy. k
Proof of Proposition 1: The proposition follows from Proposition 3, by noting that since
factor loadings are i.i.d. with mean zero, we have E [c(j)jI(j)] = 0. k
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a hierarchical structure H, that maximizes expected utility.
Since expected utility can be expressed as in equation (28), and x does not depend on H,
H must also maximize






































If H maximizes this equation for  small, then it must also maximize the lowest order term,




Proof of Lemma 2: The lemma follows from Lemma 3, by setting r = 0 and 2
 = 2
.
(Lemma 3 requires normality, but when  = 0, normality is not required in the proof.) k
Proof of Proposition 2: We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Properties of a hierarchical structure that satises conditions (i) and
(ii). Consider such a hierarchical structure, and denote by X the number of agents, by mx,
for x = 1;;X   1, the number of assets examined by the agent in level x (the top is
level 1), and by mX +1 the number of assets examined by the bottom agent. Condition (ii)
implies that there exists xp 2 f1;::;Xg (corresponding to the level of the agent who may
be working below capacity) such that mx = K   1 for all x 2 f1;::;Xgnfxpg. We have
X X
x=1
mx + 1 = N ) mxp = N   1   (X   1)(K   1);
33and
0 < mxp  K   1 ) X   1 <
N   1
K   1






where dye denotes the smallest integer that is greater or equal than y. Therefore, mxp and
X are the same for any hierarchical structure that satises conditions (i) and (ii), and we
denote them by m(N) and X(N), respectively.
Lemma 2 implies that the sum of expected squared errors (which we normalize by 4
,














Equation (33) is invariant to a permutation of fmxgx=1;::;X(N), and thus the cost is the
same for any hierarchical structure that satises conditions (i) and (ii). We denote the cost
by c(N), and show two properties of c(N). First,
c(N)   c(N   1) = [X(N)   1](K   1): (34)
To show equation (34), we use equation (33), and consider hierarchical structures where
the agent who may be working below capacity is at the top. If, with N   1 assets, the top




mx0 = [X(N)   1](K   1):
If, with N   1 assets, the top agent works at full capacity, then by adding one asset, we




mx0 = [X(N)   1](K   1);
and thus equation (34) holds. A second property of c(N) is that for n1;n2 > 1,
c(n1) + c(n2)   c(n1 + n2   1) + 2(n1   1)(n2   1) > 0: (35)
To show equation (35), we assume without loss of generality that n1  n2, and denote
the LHS by f(n2). Since c(1) = 0, we have f(1) = 0. Therefore, f(n2) is positive if it is
increasing. Using equation (34), and the denition of m(N), we have
f(n2)   f(n2   1) = [X(n2)   X(n1 + n2   1)](K   1) + 2(n1   1)
= n1   1 + m(n1 + n2   1)   m(n2): (36)
34Since
m(n1 + n2   1) = m(n1) + m(n2)   (K   1);
where  = 0 if m(n1) + m(n2)  K   1, and  = 1 if m(n1) + m(n2) > K   1, we can write
equation (36) as
n1   1 + m(n1)   (K   1): (37)
If n1 > K or  = 0, equation (37) is obviously positive. If n1  K and  = 1, equation (37)
is also positive, since
n1   1 + m(n1) = 2m(n1)  m(n1) + m(n2) > K   1:
Step 2: A cost-minimizing hierarchical structure must satisfy conditions (i)
and (ii). The key to the proof is the following dynamic programming observation. If a
hierarchical structure H is cost-minimizing, then for each agent j, the subordinate hierarchy
H(j) must also be cost-minimizing among hierarchies that invest in N(j) assets. Indeed,










[N(j0;i)   1][N(j0)   N(j0;i)];
i.e., as the cost of H(j), plus a term that depends on H(j) only through N(j). Therefore, if
H(j) is not cost-minimizing, we can replace it by a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure,
and reduce the cost of H.
To show that a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure must satisfy conditions (i) and
(ii), we use the dynamic programming observation, and proceed by induction on the number
N of assets. Suppose that the result is true for all N0 < N (N can be 1), and consider a cost-
minimizing hierarchical structure H, in which the top agent has at least two subordinates,
agents 1 and 2. We will show that H is dominated by a hierarchical structure H0, in which
H(1) is replaced by a cost-minimizing hierarchical structure H0(1) for N(1) + N(2)   1
assets, and H(2) is replaced by one asset. Using Lemma 2, and noting that H(1), H(2),
and H0(1), must satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) (from the dynamic programming observation
and the induction hypothesis), we can write the cost of H and H0 as
c(H) = c[N(1)] + c[N(2)] + [N(1)   1][N   N(1)] + [N(2)   1][N   N(2)] + ^ c;
and








[N(i)   1][N   N(i)]:
Therefore,
c(H)   c(H0) = c[N(1)] + c[N(2)]   c[N(1) + N(2)   1] + 2[N(1)   1][N(2)   1]:
Equation (34) implies that this is positive, contradicting the optimality of H. Therefore,
the top agent in H has only one subordinate, agent 1. Since the hierarchical structure H(1)
satises conditions (i) and (ii), H satises condition (i). To show that H satises condition
(ii), we need to show that the top agent in H and the agent in H(1) who may be working
below capacity (and for whom mxp = m(N  m1)) cannot both be working below capacity.
Without loss of generality (since equation (33) is invariant to a permutation of the mx's),
we assume that m1  m(N   m1). We will show that if m(N   m1) < K   1, then H is
dominated by the hierarchical structure H0 in which one asset is shifted from the top agent
to the agent working below capacity in H(1). Using equation (33), we can write the cost of
H as
c(H) = c[H(1)] + (N   m1   1)m1 = c(N   m1) + (N   m1   1)m1;
and the cost of H0 as
c(H0) = c(N   m1 + 1) + (N   m1)(m1   1):
Using equation (34), and noting that X(N   m1) = X(N   m1 + 1), we have
c(H)   c(H0) =  [X(N   m1)   1](K   1) + (N   2m1)
= (m(N   m1)   m1 + 1) > 0:
Therefore, H satises condition (ii). k
Proof of Proposition 3: From Theorem 1, it suces to show that the functions




















for j 2 J, n 2 AM(j), and i = 1;::;S(j), satisfy the rst-order conditions (18) and (19).






































































Combining equations (38) and (39), and noting that E() = 0, we have
en = Fn   F















[(j)   (j;in(j)) + E(j)   E(j;in(j))];
denotes the component of the error en for asset n, that is associated with agent j.
Consider now an agent j, and denote by B(j) the set of j's direct and indirect superiors.
We will show that for jb 2 B(j) and n 2 AN(j), we have E[en(jb)jI(j)] = 0. Since





   I(jb;in(jb))
i
= 0; (41)





is measurable w.r.t.  I(jb;in(jb)), it suces to show that the interaction term,
(jb)   (jb;in(jb)) + E(jb)   E(jb;in(jb));
has zero expectation, conditional on  I(jb;in(jb)). Using Condition 1, we have





= (jb)   (jb;in(jb)) + E
h
c(jb)




(jb)   (jb;in(jb)) + c(jb)



















   I(jb;in(jb))
i
:














and it has zero expectation, conditional on  I(jb;in(jb)), since  I(jb;in(jb))   I(jb).
Equations (40) and E[en(jb)jI(j)] = 0, imply immediately equation (18). They also





















This is equal to zero, since for all j and i, we have
P
n02AN(j;i) en0(j) = 0. k
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider j;jb 2 Jnnfjng, and suppose that jb 2 B(j). Noting that
























E[en(j)] = E [E [en(j)jI(jn)]] = 0;
the aggregation loss and interaction terms are uncorrelated. Normality then implies that
these terms are independent. Therefore, E

en(j)2
is equal to the expected squared aggre-




























   I(j;in(j))

: (45)



































































n0 + [N(j)   N(j;in(j))]
  























we can write the expected squared interaction term as
2

(1 + rN)2[N(j)   N(j;in(j))]
[1 + rN(j)][1 + rN(j;in(j))]
:
Multiplying with the expected squared aggregation loss term, and summing across agents
instead of across assets, we obtain equation (15). k
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Asset 2 Asset 1
Figure 1: The notation for a simple hierarchy. There are three agents, agent , agent 1, and agent
1,1. For agent 1, for example, we have S(1) = 1, since this agent has one subordinate, agent 1,1. We
also have M(1) = 1 and AM(1) = f3g, since agent 1 examines asset 3. Finally, we have N(1) = 3
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6 5 4 3 2 1
Figure 5: Two hierarchical structures for N = 6, K = 2, three groups of assets, and a high ability
agent.
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